richmond62 wrote: ↑Wed Jul 10, 2024 6:14 pm
The thing that I wonder about is that when MetaCard demonstrated that (at the time) there was an appetite for xTalk outwith the Macintosh universe, SC did not produce a Windows version (at the least).
To want something is much easier than to have it.
With Mac market share at the time as low as 2.2% globally, the need for a Windows version was self-evident. You could hardly read anything about Apple in the press at the time without the company name preceded with "beleaguered".
MetaCard didn't even figure into it; back then it was Unix only, few in the Mac or Windows worlds even knew about it. But everyone knew about Director, and how well Adobe was doing after their Windows port.
After Silicon Beach Software assets were acquired by Aldus to form what became Aldus Consumer Division, Aldus CEO Paul Brainerd (can't make these names up ) couldn't figure out what to do with SuperCard, being not quite a consumer tool of the sort that SuperPaint and Personal Press were. So Aldus did nothing, no major updates for years.
After repeated outcry from the community, a new company was formed and acquired SC from Aldus to become Allegiant Technologies.
How that acquisition was announced is another worthy story in itself, but the outcome seemed at the time the best of all possibilities: the new company was staffed with most of the original SC team, and financed solidly with one goal: make it the best it can be, and that includes a Windows version.
But then reality happened. Exactly why that mission never got farther than a preview build includes too many factors to list here, all meaningfully relevant, a sort of perfect storm for mission failure, where any single element might have been overcome had it not been for the others.
I could write a book about that, and now and then I think about doing so, if the number of readers who care numbered more than a few hundred.
After years of reflection and recovery (the closure of Allegiant and the end of the Windows port nearly cost me my business, the closure settlement cost all of us contractors 90% of monies owed, and I lost all of the value of the stock I'd had), if there was a single element that stands out as a transferrable lesson learned, it is this:
Hire the people most passionate about your mission.
While the Mac team was comprised of xTalk
veteranos (to use a fitting phrase from mi barrio), the Windows engineers were merely competent, and their team leader knowledgeable about software production in general but knew little about SC before he was hired.
Passion is a human performance multiplier.
And given the other factors making the task difficult (chiefly that SC was designed from its core to be a glove carefully tailored to fit the hand of the Mac Toolbox), a human performance multiplier was needed to pull off the Windows port.
Having only competency instead, the port dragged on until investors were eventually forced to reconsider continually pouring money into it without shipping.
I was there in the final days, my last train trip to their offices spent helping them pack boxes.
So the lesson for company owners has held me in good stead all the years since: hire for passion first, as everything else can be taught.
And there's a lesson for consumers and third party devs that has also proven its worth as time rolls by:
Like SuperCard for Windows, the only software that materially exists is a final shipping product.
Everything before that is just an idea, and every bit as ephemeral.
With any vendor in any industry, I barely notice product announcements, and generally ignore demoes.
The HyperCard 3.0 demo from WWDC '98 was very exciting. Oh boy, merging HC with QuickTime for cross-platform GUI richness. Apple was investing in beyond our wildest dreams. Oh the thrill of that demo!
HC was killed months later.
I live a simple life: until a software is in my hands as a shipping product, it's just an idea. The world is full of ideas, and I need to get work done today with tools that exist.
If it shows up later, I'll look at it then, when it's in my hands.
The Osborne II was a very exciting product announcement, so exciting people stopped buying the Osborne I. Starved for resources as a result of overinvestment in the future at the cost of the living present, the company folded before the new model ever shipped.